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Abstract
Consciousness is an unusual phenomenon to study scientifically. It is defined as a subjective, first-person phenomenon, and science is
an objective, third-person endeavor. This misalignment between the means—science—and the end—explaining consciousness—gave
rise to what has become a productive workaround: the search for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCCs). Science can sidestep
trying to explain consciousness and instead focus on characterizing the kind(s) of neural activity that are reliably correlated with
consciousness. However, while we have learned a lot about consciousness in the bargain, the NCC approach was not originally intended
as the foundation for a true explanation of consciousness. Indeed, it was proposed precisely to sidestep the, arguably futile, attempt
to find one. So how can an account, couched in terms of neural correlates, do the work that a theory is supposed to do: explain
consciousness? The answer is that it cannot, and in fact most modern accounts of consciousness do not pretend to. Thus, here, we
challenge whether or not any modern accounts of consciousness are in fact theories at all. Instead we argue that they are (competing)
laws of consciousness. They describe what they cannot explain, just as Newton described gravity long before a true explanation was
ever offered. We lay out our argument using a variety of modern accounts as examples and go on to argue that at least one modern
account of consciousness, attention schema theory, goes beyond describing consciousness-related brain activity and qualifies as an
explanatory theory.
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It seems so obvious that the Sun goes around the Earth—just look
up in the sky. From most vantage points, the sun rises in the east,
crosses the sky, and sets in the west every 24 hours without fail.
And we certainly do not feel the Earth moving beneath our feet.
These observations are undeniable and yet we know them to be
misleading, thanks in large measure to Galileo who championed
Copernicus’ heliocentric theory: The Earth revolves around the
Sun and not vice versa. And the Earth rotates on its axis every
24 hours, which gives the impression that the sun goes around the
Earth. Importantly, Galileo not only explained the phenomenon
but also explained why we might be inclined to believe otherwise.
The Copernican heliocentric theory is a true theory: it does not
just describe what appears in the sky but also explains why it
appears that way.
Contrast Galileo’s theory with Newton’s law of gravity. Newton
tells us to accept the truth of the equation F = G m1r2m2 . Never mind
why, it just is. This is not a theory. It may be correct. It may lead

to countless correct predictions, but still it is not a theory because
it does not explain anything. It just describes things. Famously,
Newton’s law of gravity left out any account of what could possibly
cross from one mass to another and exert a force. It was not until
Einstein that we had a true theory of gravity—an explanation.
Einstein suggested that space-time itself can be curved and that
changes in curvature transmit like a wave at the speed of light.
Note that both provide a means to make predictions, although
Einstein’s version makes more accurate and novel predictions.

Theory versus law in science
Simply put, and in the context of this article, a theory is an explanation, whereas a law is a description. Both can be true or false,
and, importantly, both can lead to correct (or incorrect) predictions. According to Webster’s dictionary, a theory is ‘a plausible
or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of principles
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Three theories of consciousness that are
really proposed laws
There are many competing accounts of consciousness that claim
to be theories. They have been cataloged, compared, and
contrasted elsewhere (Doerig et al. 2020). Many scholars, like

Chalmers (Chalmers 1996), have argued that no scientific theory
can truly explain consciousness. This is what Leibniz tried to convey in his analogy of the mill (Monadology 1714; see Discussion).
It means that when we try to explain consciousness, we arrive at
a chasm where we say ‘and then consciousness happens’ in order
to magically jump over the explanatory gap. Virtually all accounts
of consciousness have this in common. They walk you to the edge
(from different angles) and then somehow you find yourself on
the other side, without understanding how you got there. They do
not solve the hard problem, but, in all fairness, most do not claim
to either. Let us consider three popular neuroscientific accounts
of consciousness as examples: global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT), integrated information theory (IIT), and higher-order
thought theory (HOTT).
According to GNWT (Mashour et al. 2020), neural information becomes conscious when the neural activity carrying that
information gains access, in a winner-take-all fashion, to the
global neuronal workspace. The global workspace is a widely distributed network of long-range connections originating in parietal
and prefrontal cortices. When neural information enters, or takes
command of, the global workspace, then that information can
be broadcast widely throughout the brain, allowing for that information to be globally accessible to multiple specialized centers
in the brain involved in attention, valuation, memory, perception, motor output, and so on. One key feature of GNWT is that
the global workspace can only entertain one interpretation of
the sensory/perceptual data at a time such that when the global
workspace settles on a given interpretation, then other competing
interpretations are temporarily blocked out of conscious experience. Therefore, the workspace, and, by extension, consciousness,
is a kind of bottleneck from the point of view of information
processing. This aspect of the theory has been used to explain phenomena like the attentional blink (Sergent et al. 2005) and bi-stable
perceptual phenomena like the Necker cube or face-vase illusion.
One might argue, based on the above, that GNWT does explain
something—it explains why there is a lapse in sensory information
processing during the attentional blink, and why the observer can
only entertain one interpretation of the Necker cube at a time.
But that would be a red herring, vis-à-vis the phenomenon that
the theory was supposed to explain—subjective experience. The
attentional blink is an information processing phenomenon that
happens to have an effect on conscious visual perception, and
GNWT does a good job of explaining the attentional blink. But
explaining the attentional blink is not equivalent to explaining
consciousness. The attentional blink is useful as a paradigm case
(Doerig et al. 2020) for observing and describing what happens differently in the brain when an otherwise visible visual stimulus is
not consciously perceived (compared to when it is). But explaining the attentional blink does not entail explaining why global
broadcasting of information, via the global workspace, should give
rise to or be accompanied by qualia. Note that blinking your eyes
also has a profound effect on conscious visual perception, but
no one would assert that an explanation of eye blinking should
also constitute an explanation of visual consciousness. Note also
that lawful relations, like Newton’s law of gravity, can make accurate and useful predictions that can be tested, and this is true of
accounts of consciousness like GNWT. A theory goes farther—it
explains why.
One way to think about how to effectively test a theory is by
considering the selectivity of the test (Merikle et al. 2001). Finding
a selective test applicable to consciousness is difficult. One could
reasonably argue that there exists no phenomenon that selectively abolishes consciousness and has no impact on anything else. Well, what
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offered to explain phenomena’ (emphasis added; every source that
we could find includes the notion of explanation). A law, by contrast, is ‘a statement of an order or relation of phenomena that,
so far as is known, is invariable under the given conditions’. A law
describes the way things work without giving an explanation. Both
laws and theories can lead to correct predictions, but a true theory
goes further. It offers an explanation. These will be our working
definitions of theory and law in the context of this article. There
is a large body of work in the philosophy of science and philosophy of mind on the difference between a theory and a law and
what constitutes an explanation (Boyd and Bogen 2021; Woodward
and Ross 2021). Our goal here is not to enter into that longstanding debate but rather to start with the definitions offered above,
couched in terms of explanation and description and work from
there.
Is this just semantics? Well, no, not any more than the distinction between a description and an explanation is merely semantic.
We could potentially come up with a perfectly accurate description of what goes on in the brain that ‘gives rise to’ consciousness
without having any clue as to why. That is the gist of Levine’s
explanatory gap (Levine 1983). The idea of the explanatory gap
is that, while it is possible to come up with laws of consciousness,
a true scientific theory of consciousness is not possible (Goff 2019)
(assuming you identify ‘consciousness’ with qualia or subjective
experience). Here, we take up the argument that most modern
theories of consciousness, even the most prominent ones, are not
theories at all but rather are (proposed) laws. Some of them can
feasibly be tested and could end up being right or wrong, but, ultimately, they are not theories because they only describe a relation
but do not offer an explanation.
We conclude with a discussion of a relative newcomer on the
theoretical landscape, attention schema theory (AST) (Graziano
and Kastner 2011). We argue that AST is in fact a theory because
it tries to explain something, even if that something is not qualia
per se but rather the perception (or belief) that we have qualia in
the first place as something above and beyond neural information combined with selective attention. AST might end up being
supported or refuted by evidence—it could be right or wrong—
but it meets the criteria for being a theory. AST gets away with
being a theory because it does not treat consciousness as something inherently mysterious, ineffable, irreducible, or unexplainable using a reductionist or mechanistic framework (Levine 1983;
Chalmers 1996; Searle 1997; Tononi et al. 2016; Koch 2018). AST’s
explanatory power may in part be owing to the way it approaches
the problem of consciousness—by offering to explain why we
believe in consciousness rather than explaining consciousness per
se—and many people find this unsatisfactory. As a consequence,
some might claim that AST does not explain ‘consciousness’ at
all—maybe it explains our beliefs about consciousness, or our
introspective certainty that we have it (Frankish 2016) but not
‘consciousness’ itself—and they would be correct, if by ‘consciousness’ they mean qualia. This observation exposes a somewhat
neglected front in the debate about the nature of consciousness:
What is it that we are trying to explain? What is it that we should be trying to explain? What is the minimal set of facts that we need to account
for in order for our explanation to be complete?

Consciousness explained or described?

IIT makes some predictions about how the complexity of
brain activity should be a reliable signature of consciousness
(Massimini et al. 2009) and this, in turn, has contributed to the
development of a technique for inferring the presence or absence
of consciousness in noncommunicating patients with disorders
of consciousness (Casali et al. 2013). The same metric may also
have prognostic value in predicting the probability of recovery
of consciousness (Rosanova et al. 2012). Does not this speak in
favor of IIT being a true explanatory theory? Not by any means,
no. First of all, no reported case of brain damage, through injury
or stroke, has ever selectively abolished only subjective experience, leaving all other brain functions intact. Any such case study
would be famous beyond all reckoning, in every textbook, and
known to all of us in the field (were it not for the fact that it
would be impossible to diagnose1 ). Therefore, any brain function
that is intimately related to, but not identical to, consciousness, like selective attention, working memory, or perception,
could be used as a reliable signature of consciousness. IIT might
be a superb account of perception, and not a theory of consciousness, and yet still lead to the development of a highly
accurate consciousness meter because brain damage tends to
affect both perception and subjective experience in roughly equal
measure.
As long as there are other neuro-cognitive phenomena that are
tightly coupled with consciousness, you have a problem when you
rest your case on evidence of an accurate consciousness meter.
Your consciousness meter might be detecting one of those other
phenomena that are tightly coupled with consciousness and not
consciousness itself. If you are going to rest your case on that kind
of evidence, then you need disruptions that are highly selective,
and brain injuries and strokes almost never are. So, we could completely sideline consciousness, from a theoretical standpoint, and
still end up with a good consciousness meter. But the most important reason that inspiring a useful metric does not entail being an
explanatory theory is simply that laws can also yield predictions,
can be tested, and can lead to useful metrics without necessarily explaining the phenomena that they describe. Newton’s law of
gravitation declares that F = G m1r2m2 without explaining why and,
yet, it makes perfectly good predictions about the gravitational
force between two masses.
As one final example, consider HOTT (Rosenthal 2005). According to HOTT, a brain state is conscious to the extent that one
is representing oneself as being in that state. Therefore, conscious states are states about which one has formed a higherorder thought or higher-order representation. Originally HOTT
was not a neuroscientific theory but later took on a neuroscientific dimension when theorists began suggesting that specific
regions of the brain, namely the prefrontal cortex (PFC), were
responsible for instantiating higher-order representations (Lau
and Rosenthal 2011). Forming higher-order representations might
be intimately related to the faculty of metacognition, which is
thought to depend on the PFC (Fleming et al. 2010). An important caveat here is that these two ideas, rather than being two
facets of the same theory, are in fact more or less orthogonal. One
says that HOTs are necessary and sufficient for consciousness,

1
We have essentially described a philosophical zombie in this passage,
which is an oft-cited thought experiment that highlights why there is a hard
problem in the first place. How would you diagnose such a syndrome? Any
question asked of the patient and any input–output test you could conceive
of would yield identical results. So, you would have to rely on some measure
of brain activity that you had previously associated with conscious processing.
Supposing that test came up negative for consciousness? Would you consider
the patient to be the first living zombie, or would you question the validity of
your measure of consciousness? There is no clear way to adjudicate.
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about blindsight (Stoerig and Cowey 1997; Cowey 2004), you ask?
Not even close. Guessing ability in blindsight is severely limited
compared to normal conscious vision. A hemianopic patient with
blindsight might be able to correctly guess the orientation of a
bar significantly more often than chance (Schurger et al. 2006)
but then not be able to discriminate between a square and a
rectangle (Stoerig and Cowey 1997; Cowey 2004) and be utterly
unable to identify the category of visual objects (like ‘tree’, ‘car’,
‘house’, and ‘cow’). And, in the case of Type I blindsight (Cowey
2004), if you do not cue the patient to produce a guess, then the
patient may not respond at all. But even if there were a manipulation that selectively abolished e.g. conscious visual perception
and nothing else, it could only serve to make the description, or
lawful relation, more precise. A mechanistic explanation of that
manipulation, no matter how precise, would still not constitute
an explanation of subjective experience. In the case of GNWT, the
step from ‘entry into the global workspace’ to ‘qualia’ is a leap of
faith.
As another example, consider IIT (Balduzzi and Tononi 2008).
According to IIT, consciousness is integrated information. To the
extent that information is at once integrated and differentiated,
that information is conscious. Integration and differentiation are
considered to be axiomatic properties of consciousness, asserted
without proof or empirical evidence other than an appeal to
introspection (which is taken to provide ground truths). As with
Newton’s law of gravity, IIT can be expressed in the form of an
equation by which the degree of information integration can be
computed and assigned a value called ϕ (phi). A system with
zero ϕ is not conscious, and systems with nonzero ϕ are conscious to varying degrees, with the value of ϕ expressing the
degree to which the system is conscious. If ϕ is taken at face
value, then according to IIT, some very simple systems that prima
facie are not conscious are in fact highly conscious because they
have a rather high value of ϕ (Aaronson 2014; Horgan 2015).
This is not a problem for IIT, however, since the theory openly
embraces pan-psychism—the idea that consciousness is a fundamental property of physical systems, much like inertia, and
that everything in the universe, with nonzero ϕ, possesses it to
some degree. Thus, rocks and trees and the solar system may
have a degree of consciousness. Unlike with inertia, however,
you cannot reach out and verify the presence of consciousness
in e.g. a sea slug. You could compute ϕ in the sea slug, but
then you would have to accept the assertion that ϕ selectively
indexes consciousness and not something else that happens to
covary with consciousness in humans. Although (highly) impractical, ϕ can in theory be computed for systems like brains but not
without computing power that we can hardly envision, let alone
realize.
IIT does not have parsimony on its side—it is a very complex
theory, and the math behind computing ϕ is orders of magnitude
more complex than the math behind Newton’s law of gravitation. In fact, an early exposition of IIT (before it was given that
moniker) equated consciousness with complexity (Tononi and
Edelman 1998). But we do not need to delve into that complexity
in order to evaluate whether IIT explains or merely describes consciousness. The equation for ϕ, much like Newton’s mathematical
formulation of his law of gravity, describes a lawful relation, but
IIT does not explain why that lawful relation holds. The step from
ϕ to subjective experience is a leap of faith. IIT describes something that is alleged to covary with consciousness (the result of a
mathematical equation and thus not identical to consciousness),
but it does not explain why qualia are present when ϕ > 0 and
absent otherwise.
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(i.e. neural information) that are judged to be unified.2 Normally,
when we consciously perceive a perceptual object—a face, for
example—we can immediately report on the properties of that
information content, but we have no introspective access whatsoever as to how that information content came to be conscious—
which is the central question in the scientific study of consciousness. In fact, consciousness per se is arguably one phenomenon
that we do not have direct introspective access to. Claiming that
one has ‘direct undeniable first-person introspective access to the
properties of consciousness’ thus entails a commitment to the
assertion that perception (i.e. the formation of internal representations in the form of neural activity) is identical to consciousness.
But if that were the case, then we would not need a science of
consciousness in the first place.

Attention schema theory
We argue here that at least one proposed theory of consciousness,
AST, is indeed an explanatory theory and not an asserted law. It
does not merely describe the conditions in which consciousness
occurs but explains how those conditions result in (among other
things) the objectively measurable phenomenon of people being
absolutely certain that they have a conscious experience. Some
might argue that comparing AST to other accounts of consciousness is vacuous and ultimately misleading because, in contrast
to other accounts, AST is not trying to explain subjective experience per se but rather is trying to explain the belief in and beliefs
about subjective experience—the explanandum is not the same.
While true that the explanandum is indeed not the same, this fact
does not grant a license to dismiss AST as irrelevant to consciousness because AST is not simply a theory of why people believe
themselves to have qualia. That would be akin to claiming that
Einstein’s theory of gravity is simply a theory of why apples fall
from trees to the ground. In fact, it is a theory of something called
gravity, and that theory happens to explain, among other things,
why apples fall from trees to the ground. Likewise, AST is a theory of something called consciousness that explains why, among
other things, people believe themselves to have qualia. Consciousness, according to AST, is a special kind of percept that arises
due to the workings of a hypothetical mechanism called an ‘attention schema’. The attention schema helps to guide, stabilize, and
control selective attention, and having an attention scheme can
lead to an adamant belief in an ineffable something extra that
we might call qualia. This necessarily implies a different sort of
explanandum from the one we typically associate with the mystery of consciousness, but this is a feature of AST, not a bug. To
see why, consider the following story:
Suppose that a community of ancient scholars debates a question. The explanandum that interests them: at the end of each
day, the sun sets down somewhere in the distance to the west
and its fire is extinguished. And each morning it is reignited in
the east and travels across the sky throughout the day only to
be extinguished once again in the west. How does that happen?
They propose a host of ideas, perhaps some of them true theories (attempts to explain) and some of them laws (descriptions of
the circumstances). Now imagine that one of those scholars, let
us call him Jake, comes up with a new idea: The sun does not set
down or go out. Rather, the phenomenon to explain is the movement of heavenly bodies around each other. We cannot see the
2
And even that is debatable: there may be clinical cases, such as in Balint’s
syndrome, where the patient might declare that consciousness is not unified—
even though we have no reason to doubt that the patient is in fact conscious.
This is an empirical question and has yet, to our knowledge, been tested.
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and the other says that PFC is responsible for instantiating
HOTs. One could be right while the other is wrong or vice versa,
or both could be right, or both could be wrong. But whether
we think of them together or separately, neither explains why
HOTs (whether instantiated in PFC or elsewhere) should give
rise to subjective experience. It may well turn out to be true
that wherever there is a HOT there is a conscious state, and
vice versa, but we are offered no explanation as to why that
should be the case. HOTT is a description (perhaps accurate,
perhaps not) of which kinds of states are conscious and which
are not.
You might argue that theories of consciousness are not trying to explain consciousness per se, as in qualia or subjective
experience, but rather are trying to account for the mechanics of
consciousness in the brain. This would be the approach inherited
from the ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCC) research program (Crick and Koch 1998). But then what would such an account
be trying to explain? What would be the target phenomenon, if not
subjective experience? All modern accounts of consciousness are
of the form ‘when conditions X, Y, and Z are met then consciousness happens, or is allowed to happen’. This is a description, not
an explanation, because it does not address the questions of ‘how’
and ‘why’. Why should it be that when Conditions X, Y, and Z are
met, consciousness happens or emerges? This is the very question that the NCC program of research was aimed at skirting, and
this was a wise workaround because it enabled empirical research
to continue to flourish without getting hung up on a potentially
unanswerable question. What was never acknowledged, however,
was that, in doing so, we forego the possibility of building a true
theory. Essentially, the NCC program of research says, forget
about explaining consciousness for now. We may or may not ever
be able to do that. But we can describe what goes on in the brain
when consciousness is present versus absent. We do not have to
explain how consciousness comes to be (i.e. a theory) in order to
describe the neural correlates of consciousness (i.e. a law).
In all fairness to the accounts of consciousness discussed
above, and to the many other accounts that we have not discussed, none claims to solve the hard problem of consciousness.
By asserting that they do not, we are neither condemning nor
even criticizing them. We are, however, asserting that they are
not true theories of consciousness but rather ought to be thought
of as (competing) laws of consciousness. They describe the kind
of states or nature of brain activity that underlies consciousness
without pretending to explain why.
One might counter that, in the case of some accounts of consciousness, such as IIT, the claim is of an identity relation—like
‘water is H2O’ or ‘lightening is an electrical discharge’—and identities do not need to be explained. But this claim is problematic
because, unlike other phenomena, we have no direct third-person
empirical data about consciousness per se, whereas we do (or at
least can) with other phenomena like water or lightening. These
data are necessary in order to support the claim of an identity
relation. Proponents of IIT would argue that we do, however, have
direct first-person introspective access to properties of consciousness and that those properties can be used to establish the identity
relation (Tononi et al. 2016). But do we have direct introspective
access to the properties of consciousness?
It is easy to confuse ‘access to consciousness’ with ‘access to
the contents of consciousness’. One could argue that, in fact,
what we really have direct introspective access to are the contents of consciousness and not consciousness per se. For example,
when one declares one’s own consciousness to be unified, another
could counter by asserting that it is the contents of consciousness
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When we refer to information, we mean the resolution of uncertainty or
an arrangement of matter and/or energy that can resolve uncertainty.

schema is a set of information about kinematic, dynamic, and
structural aspects of the body. Our intellectual beliefs about the
world and political, religious, and scientific beliefs are models
at a more cognitive level. But, as the statistician George Box is
supposed to have said, ‘All models are wrong; some are useful’.
The brain’s models are always approximate rather than literally
accurate. If the brain built fully accurate, detailed models of
everything relevant to survival, it would run out of processing
power posthaste.
Now, we can approach the question: why are people so convinced that they have an ineffable, subjective feel that accompanies their thinking and their perception? Why are people so
convinced that they have consciousness? Chalmers has called this
question the ‘meta-problem’ of consciousness (Chalmers 2018).
Logically, the answer is that the human brain constructs an information set, a part of a self-model, on the basis of which people
derive the belief and certainty that they have a conscious experience. Moreover, if this self-model is like every other model studied
in neuroscience or psychology, then it is likely to be an inexact
representation—a simplification and distortion of some actual,
physically measurable property of the self.
Thus far, the self-model view may seem odd. After all, we do
not believe we have consciousness. We simply have it. We are used
to the intuitively compelling argument that ‘I know I have a conscious feeling inside me, because I’m experiencing it right now. I
can feel it’. But this argument is a tautology. It is equivalent to
saying, ‘I know it’s true because it’s true. I know I have a feeling,
because I feel the feeling’. When the architects of IIT assert that
the presence of consciousness is axiomatically true or, as Tononi
puts it, the one thing that we know for certain, they are engaging in
tautology. Instead, what we know with some reasonable scientific
certainty is that the brain has constructed a set of information on
the basis of which a belief is derived. Cognition has gained access
to an information set; the information set is part of a self-model;
based on that information, cognition arrives at the belief and the
certainty that a conscious feeling is present. We think we have
something nonphysical and intangible inside us, a hard problem,
because, whatever it is that we actually have, whatever physical
process is the subject of that self-model, the model depicts it in
an incomplete manner.
This self-model perspective has deep roots in a philosophical
view called illusionism (Dennett 1988, 1991; Frankish 2016). The
term illusionism is, however, arguably not the best label. Perhaps, rather than suggesting that consciousness is an illusion,
it would be more apt to say that it is a perceptual caricature.
Unlike the term illusion, the term caricature implies the presence of something real that is being caricatured. In this self-model
perspective, something physically real and objectively measurable exists inside us; the brain constructs a simplified, distorted
model of that physical mechanism; and on the basis of that model,
we believe we have an essentially magical, conscious experience.
The scientific question of consciousness then becomes: what is
the real mechanism that gives rise to the self-model on which
our belief in a hard problem of consciousness depends? AST is
a specific theory that addresses that question.
AST relates consciousness to attention (Graziano and Kastner
2011; Graziano 2013; Webb and Graziano 2015). It proposes that
selective attention is a real, physical process in the brain; the brain
constructs a simplified, descriptive model of attention, termed the
attention schema (in parallel to the body schema); and on the
basis of the information in the attention schema, higher cognition arrives at the belief and certainty that a subjective conscious
experience is present. One can arrive at the theory from several
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sun at night because, as the earth rotates, the bulk of the earth
stands between it and us. The ancient scholars could accuse Jake
of cheating, ‘solving’ the problem simply by denying the original explanandum—cutting the Gordian knot instead of untying
it. They may be right, from one philosophical point of view. But
Jake is still correct. With a re-conceptualization of the problem,
and a new explanandum, the problem makes more sense, and an
explanatory theory becomes possible. It is absolutely fair to compare Jake’s explanation to the prevailing explanation, even if they
have different explananda. Scientific progress depends on making
such comparisons and tossing out the conceptual framework that
fails to produce a viable and veritable theory.
In addition to the argument above, we also remind the reader
that we are making two different claims in our article, and only the
latter of the two is subject to the criticism about explananda. Our
main claim (elucidated earlier) is that most purported theories
of consciousness are not in fact theories. Our argument in support of that claim is agnostic as to what the target phenomenon
(or explanandum) is. Whatever the explanatory target happens
to be—an extra something, or the belief in an extra something—
either way, a theory must do more than just describe the physical facts that reliably accompany the target phenomenon. We
argue that most current accounts of consciousness are not in fact
theories of that which they claim to be theories of.
Our second claim (argued below) is about what AST in particular is trying to explain and how AST is in fact an explanatory
theory. AST explains why people are convinced that they have this
extra something. AST does not explain how this extra something
comes about. One could assert that, according to AST, consciousness simply does not exist. We only believe it does, and it is an
illusion. This characterization may be true, but it misses much
of the meaning of AST. The whole point of AST is to link the
belief that we have consciousness with an actual thing that we
actually have: selective attention. Consciousness is not an empty
illusion. It is a distortion or caricature of something real: selective
attention. AST explains how people can control their attention
as well as they do (because they have an internal model of it),
and AST explains how people can predict the behavior of others so well (because we construct models of their attention, and
what they attend to tends to drive their behavior), and AST also
explains why people believe, insist, think, and claim to have
something—subjective experience—that defies any kind of reductionist or mechanistic explanation. Yes, AST explains why we
believe we have consciousness, but to insist only on that facet of
AST misses the bigger picture. It is a bit like trying to explain how
an automobile engine works to someone who is primarily interested in the phenomenon of the sound coming from the engine.
Yes, AST can explain that sound, but that is barely scratching the
surface of what AST can explain as an engineering theory of how
to build and understand the engine.
AST is a specific version of what might be called the self-model
approach to consciousness. To understand how the self-model
approach works, first, consider a small, but crucial, piece of logic.
Everything that you think is true about yourself—everything, no
matter how certain you are of it—must stem from information3 in
the brain, or you would not be able to think the thought or articulate the claim. What we believe to be true depends on bundles of
information, effectively models. The brain is a model builder. The
visual system builds visual models, rich sets of information that
represent the shape and color and movement of objects. The body
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Computational models and computer
simulations
Some accounts of consciousness, like GNWT, have been implemented in the form of a computational model/computer simulation (Dehaene et al. 1998, 2003). But such computational models
beg the question of what, precisely, the model should produce
as output in order to be considered a model of consciousness
rather than a model of, say, attention, or neural information

processing (NIP), or of a specific phenomenon like the attentional blink. Computer simulations of the GNWT do a good job
of explaining the attentional blink and its attendant bottleneck in
NIP. But what outputs of these simulations should we consider to
account specifically for consciousness, rather than accounting for
NIP, attention, or the attentional blink? The attentional blink is a
phenomenon that happens to have an effect on conscious perception of sensory stimuli, but it is not identical with consciousness.
So, a theory that explains the attentional blink is not necessarily a theory of consciousness. GNWT stands quite well on its own
as a theory of NIP without having to explain how or why qualia
are associated with information that reaches the global neuronal
workspace.
AST can also be implemented in the form of a computational
model (Wilterson and Graziano 2021). The goal is not to explain
qualia per se but rather to explain the emergence of utterances
about qualia or of having perceived a particular stimulus. Note,
however, that a theory does not have to be computational in
nature in order to explain its target phenomenon. Darwin’s theory
of evolution by natural selection can be turned into a computational simulation, but it still has just as much explanatory
power even without being implemented as a simulation. Indeed, it
existed as a theory since long before it was even possible to simulate evolution (with e.g. genetic algorithms). Likewise, AST counts
as an explanatory theory even without having been implemented
in a computer simulation.
Perhaps closer in spirit to AST, recent higher-order computational models of awareness, including the ‘higher-order state
space’ model (Fleming 2020), and the ‘predictive global neuronal
workspace’ model (Whyte and Smith 2021) offer the ability to
simulate higher-order states that might support a predictive selfmodel. However, neither account explains how that predictive
self-model leads to declarations of having consciousness (whether
of state or of content). AST explains how a self-model leads to the
belief that ‘I am conscious’, and in that way AST is fundamentally different. Although AST might be thought of as a kind of
HOTT, thinking that HOTs produce consciousness betrays a misunderstanding of AST. It is not a theory in which having a HOT
makes you conscious. Rather it is a theory in which you have a HOT
that tells you that you have consciousness. Therefore, you think that
you have it. The attention schema is a nonverbal model, so believing that you are conscious of an object does not require a verbal
declaration. The question answered by AST is why we believe at a
nonverbal, intuitive, automatic level that there is such a thing as
conscious experience and that we are having one.

AST is a proper theory
To many people, AST may not be a satisfying theory because it
does not explain how the brain generates a subjective essence of
consciousness. It sidesteps the hard problem. And, yet, whether
you believe the theory or find it lacking, it is an explanatory theory, not an asserted law. It attempts to explain the behavior of the
system by offering, among other things, an explanation of why
people claim to have consciousness. The types of behaviors that
the theory tries to explain are e.g. beliefs and utterances of the
form ‘There is more to me than just input→processing→ output.
I have qualia’. Why do we believe we have subjective awareness?
That belief stems from a deeper model, a model of attention. Why
do we have a model of attention? Because the human brain has the
ability to control its focus of attention, and like all control systems,
this one benefits from having a model depicting the thing it controls. Why do people believe subjective awareness is a nonphysical
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directions, but one especially obvious path starts with the close
relationship between consciousness and attention.
Attention is a mechanism by which some items are given a signal boost in the brain and are thereby processed in greater depth
and gain a greater influence over output systems (Desimone and
Duncan 1995; Corbetta and Shulman 2002; Beck and Kastner 2009;
Moore and Zirnsak 2017). The brain contains control mechanisms
that allow it to strategically shift attention not only among sensory events but also to shift focus among memories and thoughts.
Attention, or a controlled and selective signal enhancement, is
an entirely mechanistic, physical process that can be measured
objectively by a variety of means, some involving direct measurement of neuronal events in the brain and some involving the
measurement of behavioral accuracy and latency.
Consciousness is similar in many ways to attention. When we
are conscious of something, we feel that we are processing it, we
grasp it with the mind, and we are able to respond to it. Moreover, attention and consciousness almost always move together.
What your brain is attending to, you are almost always subjectively aware of. Nothing shows this close relationship better than
the famous gorilla experiment of Simons and Chabris (Simons and
Chabris 1999). People who watched a video of a basketball game,
focusing their attention on the basketball, were totally unaware
of the man in a gorilla suit dancing right across the center of the
scene. By keeping attention on Object A and away from B, people
attached their subjective consciousness to A and were unaware
of B.
Yet, consciousness and attention can be separated. In laboratory circumstances, it is possible for a person’s attention to
be exogenously drawn to a visual stimulus, while at the same
time, the person reports no subjective consciousness of the stimulus (Woodman and Luck 2003; Tsushima et al. 2006; Kentridge
et al. 2008). When attention and consciousness become decoupled,
although attention can remain, one aspect of attention is drastically impaired. The control of attention disappears (Webb et al.
2016; Wilterson et al. 2020). People lose the ability to endogenously
suppress attention, sustain attention, or strategically shift attention with respect to the stimulus of which they are unconscious.
Thus, although attention can exist without consciousness, it is not
quite right to say that attention is independent of consciousness.
The two have a complex and intertwined relationship.
AST proposes that this complex relationship between consciousness and attention reflects a simple, underlying mechanism. To help control its own attention, the brain constructs a
simplified model of attention. The information in that model,
when accessed by higher cognition, leads to the belief that we
have subjective consciousness. For example, when you look at
an apple, your knowledge about the apple—its color and shape—
comes from a sensory model constructed in the visual system. But
your belief that there is something else—a subjective experience,
a feeling that comes with processing the apple—stems from an
attention schema, an imprecise but useful model of the process
of attending (to the apple, in this case).

Consciousness explained or described?

General discussion
Here, we have argued that most supposed theories of consciousness are not really theories at all but rather are competing laws
of consciousness. This is because they do not explain why the
XYZ of the theory (which is different for different theories) necessarily implies subjective experience. Instead, these accounts
merely describe the conditions that are supposed to bring about
consciousness. In doing so, these accounts can make testable predictions, but that does not elevate them to the level of being a
theory because a law can also make testable predictions. These
accounts may also explain various related phenomena (like the
attentional blink, for example) that have an effect or impact
on subjective experience; but explaining these related phenomena is also not the same as explaining subjective experience or
qualia. Indeed, we assert that any ‘theory’ that is confronted
with, but does not bridge, the explanatory gap is not a true theory of consciousness, once we agree that the explanandum is
subjective experience. Otherwise, that account would be analogous to asserting that heating milk reduces the risk of disease. It
may be true, and it might be useful knowledge, but it is not an
explanation. Heating milk reduces the risk of disease because the
microorganisms in milk that are responsible for disease cannot
tolerate the heat. This account answers the questions ‘how’ and
‘why’.
We also argued that at least one candidate theory of consciousness, AST, does offer a genuine explanation. One might
argue that AST, like all other accounts, also fails to bridge the
explanatory gap, just in a different way. One could argue that
the explanandum in AST is not the right one—it is not the ineffable something extra that is not accounted for in a simple
input→processing→output model. But, in fact, AST is concerned
with the explanatory gap, even though it may seem to sidestep it.
AST explains why people are prone to think there is an explanatory gap. Like Galileo’s heliocentric theory, it not only explains
how things really are but also explains why we might be inclined
to believe otherwise. So it does not really turn its back on the
hard problem. Instead, it takes the human intuition that a hard
problem exists and puts that intuition at the heart of a useful cognitive mechanism. It is saying, no, a magic consciousness essence
does not exist. But the belief in that magic essence is actually
really important because it acts as a rough and ready model of
something else that really does exist: selective attention.

To reiterate, one might argue that AST is not even on the same
playing field as other accounts because AST is trying to explain
the belief in qualia, whereas other accounts are aimed at qualia
per se. Since these are fundamentally different things (and potentially independent), there is no point in comparing AST to other
accounts of consciousness. But this perspective completely misses
the point. AST is trying to wrestle the definition of consciousness away from being a ‘something else’ that, it seems, we cannot
possibly explain in reductionist or mechanistic terms. AST wants
to redefine what consciousness is. It is not trying to deny the
existence of consciousness or explain consciousness away but is
just trying to reframe the question and define consciousness in a
different way.
As we mentioned in the introduction, our argument exposes
a neglected front in the debate about the neural basis of consciousness: What is it that we are trying to explain? What is it
that we should be trying to explain? What is the minimal set
of facts that we need to account for in order for our explanation to be complete? Consider the example of studying ghosts.
A lot of people believe in them, and pretty adamantly. In fact,
there are probably far more people in the world who believe in
ghosts and souls than there are people who believe in qualia
(given that most people in the world do not even know what the
word ‘qualia’ means). Maybe there is something to it, who knows.
How might we approach a question like this, scientifically? We
could throw everything we have—technology, equipment, theory,
math, physics, … everything—at trying to understand how ghosts
come about. Or, we could focus our efforts on studying why people believe in the existence of ghosts. That would also be a valid
avenue of research, perhaps orthogonal to the original question of
whether or not ghosts exist in the first place. The question then
is this: if we succeed in coming up with a clear and comprehensive account of why people believe in ghosts, are we done? Is there
anything else in need of explaining, given that our best efforts to
find and measure ghosts have all come up dry?
The state of affairs with consciousness research is not so different from this caricature. Great thinkers for centuries have been
saying essentially the same thing: The mind (aka consciousness)
is really perplexing. It sure seems like there must be something
extra in there beyond just input→processing→output, yet, try as
we may, there is no sign of anything extra—at least not that we can
physically measure. Leibniz’s Mill, alluded to in the introduction,
is a classic example:
It must be confessed, moreover, that perception, and that which
depends on it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is, by figures
and motions. And, supposing that there were a mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we might enter it as into
a mill. And this granted, we should only find on visiting it, pieces which
push one against another, but never anything by which to explain a
perception.
Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology, 1714

Take a step back and look at it from a distance: Imagine that
zombie aliens come to visit the Earth from another planet, and
they learn that some of us share a very adamant belief in something as yet never before physically detected called qualia. With no
institutional review board to stand in their way, they rifle around
in human brains with sophisticated equipment, and, as Leibniz
predicted, they find nothing but neurons and glia and the like. And
at the same time, they conclude that input→processing→output
is enough to account for, well, pretty much everything else, including the belief in qualia itself. What might those visitors from another
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essence, a hard problem? Because we are misled by that model of
attention. Being an imperfect model, lacking details, its depiction
of attention is of a mysterious, nonphysical essence that can seize
hold of items and vividly know them.
The theory may have many gaps. For example, what networks
in the brain compute this information? What exactly is the informational content of the attention schema? Can it ever be partial,
or is it all or nothing? How does an attention schema relate to
components of other theories, such as GNWT or HOTT? Some of
these questions are being addressed experimentally and may take
many years to resolve. Perhaps, in the end, the data will show
the theory to be wrong. But for all the specific scientific gaps, AST
does not contain the one, the big explanatory gap. There is no
leap of faith. AST is not a proposed law that asserts: when Conditions X, Y, and Z occur, then consciousness emerges. It is a theory
that explains how the strong belief in consciousness occurs and
also explains the complex, experimentally observed relationship
between consciousness and attention.
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world rightfully conclude about this extra something that we call
‘qualia’? AST explains that conviction as a necessary by-product
of a useful mechanism: an internal model of selective attention.
With a viable explanation like this in hand, and Occam’s razor as
a guiding principle, what should we conclude? As long as consciousness is defined as something intrinsically inaccessible from
the outside, then accounts that try to explain it can never be true
scientific theories.

None declared.
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